Mr Nicholas Papalexandrakos

    THE ARCHITECTS REGISTRATION BOARD

PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT COMMITTEE

_______________

In the matter of

Nicholas Papalexandrakos (095455A)

Held via video conference on:

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12 – 19 May, 1 – 2 July, 15 July and 17 July 2025

Present

Andrew Lewis (Committee Chair)

Stuart Carr (Committee Architect Member)

Alastair Cannon (Committee Lay Member)

———–

In this case, the ARB was represented by Ms Ella Crine (“the Presenter”) instructed by Kingsley Napley LLP.

Nicolas Papalexandrakos (“the Registered Person”) attended the hearing and was represented by Mr Luke Wygas instructed by RPC (Reynolds Porter Chamberlain LLP).

 

Allegation

1. The allegation made against Nicholas Papalexandrakos (“the Registered Person”) is that he is guilty of Unacceptable Professional Conduct.

2. The Architects Registration Board (“the ARB”) relies upon the following particulars in support of the allegation:

1. The Registered Person did not provide adequate terms of engagement, contrary to Standard 4.4 of the Architect’s Code;
2. The Registered Person:
     a) Did not act without undue delay; and/or
     b) Did not provide adequate advice regarding project timescales;
3. The Registered Person did not adequately communicate with the client;
4. The Registered Person did not act appropriately and/or impartially in respect of:
     a) The appointment of a builder; and/or
     b) The preparation of the building contract; and/or
     c) The appointment of a Structural Engineer;
5. The Registered Person:
    a) Did not provide adequate tender documentation; and/or
    b) Did not provide adequate advice in respect of tender documentation;
6. The Registered Person’s acts at particular 4 lacked integrity.

Background

3. The Registered Person is a registered architect and is self-employed. He completed his BSc in Architecture in 2004 and his Part 3 qualifications in 2011. He remained an architectural designer until 2019 when he first registered as an architect with the ARB. At that time, he sat up PPLX Architects as a sole trader while continuing to work for another firm four days per week.

4. In 2021, Ms Vijay Poinoosawmy (“the Referrer”) decided that she wanted to modernise her home at [REDACTION] (“the Property”) to make it easier to care for her father, with whom she lived.

5. Prior to contacting the Registered Person, the Referrer contacted a surveyor and also an architectural designer, who submitted a pre-planning application for advice on the proposed works. The Referrer received pre-planning application advice to the effect that it was unlikely planning permission would be granted for the application as it then stood.

6. The Referrer contacted the Registered Person in around June 2022, on the recommendation of a colleague. The Referrer and the Registered Person discussed the project and the Referrer explained that there was urgency with the project due to her father’s age and deteriorating health.

7. On 29 June 2022 the Registered Person emailed the Referrer with a fee proposal for the planning stage of the project. The Registered Person prepared plans and submitted a planning application to Enfield Council (“the Council”) on 2 September 2022. There was some discussion about the Registered Person producing drawings while a decision was awaited but none were produced.

8. Planning permission was granted on 19 October 2022. There is no dispute that the permission was granted approximately two weeks sooner than the Registered Person and the Referrer expected. The Registered Person telephoned the Referrer the same day and confirmed that he would provide the necessary building control drawings for the next stage of the project.

9. On 22 November 2022, the Registered Person sent the Referrer an estimate of building costs and on 28 November the Registered Person sent the Referrer a fee proposal in respect of “Preparation of structural drawings/calculations, for construction and Building control”. He indicated that the drawings could be completed by 4 December 2022.
10. Drawings were not produced in that time frame and the Referrer wrote on 12 December 2022 indicating that she would instruct another architect, if the Registered Person could not complete the drawings. The Registered Person replied on 13 December 2022, apologising and promising that the drawings were ready.

11. The Registered Person was thereafter involved in the process of selecting a building contractor and a contract between a builder, and the Referrer was signed on 7 February 2023. The completion date was fixed as 4 August 2023.

12. In the weeks before the contract was signed, there was correspondence about the role that the Registered Person might play at the construction stage. On 25 January 2023 the Referrer wrote to the Registered Person. “I will be going with …(the builder). I will let him know…. Also, if you could send me costings for you overseeing the project please? I know you mentioned there are several ways you could do this?” The Registered Person replied “I’m really looking forward to seeing this be built, I will be there to assist you on all matters going forward… will come back to you regarding the other bits.”

13. When building started, the Registered Person played a role in the supervision of the build until his involvement was ended by the Referrer by a WhatsApp message dated 14 March 2023.

 

Admissions

14. The Particulars of Allegation were read to the Registered Person at the start of the hearing in accordance with rule 25 (c) of the Investigations and Professional Conduct Committee Rules (the Rules).

15. The Registered Person admitted Particular 1 and that was recorded as admitted and found proved in accordance with Rule 25(d).

16. It was understood that there was a legal argument to be resolved about the extent of the admission and that is dealt with below.

17. With regard to Particular 4, the Registered Person accepted that he had not acted appropriately in respect of the preparation of the building contract because the builder’s address was not written on the contract. That partial admission was not recorded as found proved.

Evidence

18. The Committee had before it documentary evidence which included the following:

ARB documentation

i. Final Hearing Bundle 518 pages
ii. Solicitors Report to ARB
iii. Statement of the Referrer – 19 Sept 2024
iv. Expert Report of Christopher Smart 4 February 2025
v. Exhibits D1 to D337
vi. Registered Persons Representations E1-83
vii. Disclosed Unused Material 28 pages

Registered Persons documentation

i. Defence signed by Luke Wygas undated
ii. Statements of the Registered Person – 24 April 2025 and 9 May 2025
iii. Respondent’s Exhibit Bundle 114 pages
iv. Expert Report of Clare Ailward 24 April 2025 22 pages

 

Additional documentation

i. Joint statement of the expert witnesses 8 May 2025

19. The Committee also heard oral evidence from

i. The Referrer
ii. The Registered Person
iii. Mr Christopher Smart, expert witness called by the ARB
iv. Ms Clare Ailward, expert witness called by the Registered Person

20. At the end of the ARB’s evidence, Mr Wygas submitted that there was no case to answer in respect of Particulars 2, 4, 5 and 6.

21. The Committee found that there was a case to answer in respect of particulars 2, 4a, 4b and Particular 6. The Committee found there was no case to answer in respect of Particulars 4c and 5.

22. The reasons for the Committee’s decision are set out in Appendix A to this decision.

Findings of fact

23. The Committee received submissions on facts from Ms Crine, in which she drew the Committee’s attention to the relevant law and evidence. The Committee also received submissions from Mr Wygas.

24. The Committee refers to those submissions, where relevant when setting out its decision in respect of each Particular of the Allegation.

25. The Committee also received legal advice from the Chair, which it followed in its approach to the allegations. The Committee summarises that advice as follows.

26. The Chair advised the Committee that the burden of proof lies on the ARB and the standard of proof is the balance of probabilities. The Registered Person does not have to prove or disprove anything.

27. The Committee must not speculate but can draw inferences from facts it has found proved. When drawing an inference, it should set out the fact it has found proved, the inferences it has drawn and explain why it has drawn them.

28. The Committee does not have to resolve every disputed fact in this case only those that are necessary to enable it to reach a decision on the Particulars of the Allegation.

29. When assessing the evidence of witnesses, the Committee should remember that memory is fallible and not place undue reliance upon demeanour. It should compare the evidence of witnesses with contemporaneous documents and start from the position that such documents are likely to be the most reliable source of evidence.

30. When choosing between the evidence of expert witnesses, the Committee should also be careful not to place undue weight on demeanour examine the reasons each expert gives for their opinion.

31. When assessing the Registered Person’s evidence, the Committee should remember that he is an architect against whom there have been no previous adverse regulatory findings of any sort. The Committee should weigh that in his favour when assessing his evidence and the likelihood that he would act as alleged by the ARB.

32. The Committee should bear in mind that the Particulars of Allegation that the Registered Person faces are significantly narrower than the original complaint and narrower than the areas covered by the expert evidence from both parties.

33. The particulars of allegation cover the period from June 2022 when the Registered Person was instructed until his engagement ended on 14 March 23. They do not include:

i. Any allegation regarding the nature of the relationship between the Registered Person and the builder,
ii. An allegation that the builder carried out his work badly,
iii. Any allegation that the Registered Person carried out supervision on site inadequately or in any way at all.

34. It follows from that that the Committee must be particularly careful to base any decisions upon evidence that is relevant to the allegation in front of it.

35. The duty to act impartially is derived from paragraph 6.4 of The Architects Code: Standards of Professional Conduct and Practice (“the Code”) which provides that
“You should, when acting between parties or giving advice, exercise impartial and independent professional judgment.”

36. There is no single mental state associated with impartiality, but lack of impartiality must be more than a mere error of judgment and involves putting the architect’s own interests or that of another above those of his client.

37. The meaning of integrity is derived from the Court of Appeal’s decision in Wingate and Evans -v- SRA and SRA -v- Malins [2018] EWCA Civ 366: “In professional codes of conduct, the term “integrity” is a useful shorthand to express the higher standards which society expects from professional persons and which the professions expect from their own members. … The underlying rationale is that the professions have a privileged and trusted role in society. In return they are required to live up to their own professional standards.”

 

Findings of fact

38. Before turning to each Particular of the Allegation the Committee observed that there is a significant overlap between the Particulars. The Committee reminded itself that it required to deal with each Particular in turn, and must bear in mind that it is not necessarily finding a course of conduct to be more serious because it is caught by more than one Particular of the Allegation.

39. The Committee also observed that there were occasions when the recollections of the Registered Person and the Referrer differed regarding what was agreed when they met. Counsel very properly explored in cross examination whether it could be said that one or other of them was “lying”. Having listened carefully to both witnesses the Committee did not form the view that either was deliberately lying to the Committee.

40. The Committee concluded that each was trying to do their best to recall the events of meetings that took place between 2 ½ and 3 years ago in circumstances where there appears to have been no written record of what was discussed or agreed. The Committee acknowledges that is not the subject of any further allegation against the Registered Person but observes that it is in all the circumstances both surprising and disappointing.

41. In those circumstances the Committee has resolved any differences by reference to what the parties did and such correspondence and documentation as there is. Where necessary, the Committee has also borne in mind that the project was of great importance to the Referrer and something she has tried to remember as much about as possible while the Registered Person appears to have been struggling with other matters at the time, some of a personal nature.

 

Particular 1

42. The Committee reminded itself that this Particular is based on standard 4.4 of the code which provides:

You are expected to ensure that before you undertake any professional work you have entered into a written agreement with the client which adequately covers:

i. the contracting parties;
ii. the scope of the work:
iii. the fee or method of calculating it;
iv. who will be responsible for what;
v. any constraints or limitations on the responsibilities of the parties;
vi. the provisions for suspension or termination of the agreement, including any legal rights of cancellation;
vii. a statement that you have adequate and appropriate insurance cover as specified by the ARB.

43. Mr Wygas acknowledged that both the first fee proposal (before the Registered Person undertook the work for the planning permission) and the second fee proposal (dated 28 November 2022, in relation to the preparation of technical drawings) failed to comply with Standard 4.4 to the extent that they did not provide for

i. the provisions for suspension or termination of the agreement, including any legal rights of cancellation;
ii. a statement that the Registered Person has adequate and appropriate insurance cover as specified by the ARB,
iii. the existence of any Alternative Dispute Resolution schemes that the contract is subject to and how they might be accessed,
iv. that the Registered Person has a complaints-handling procedure available on request; and
v. that the Registered Person is registered with the Architects Registration Board and is subject to the Code.

44. Mr Wygas recognised in his submissions that the allegation had a second part namely that the Registered Person “did not clarify the extent of his role in relation to the project”.

45. The Committee was satisfied that, whether the obligation arose at the time of the first fee proposal or the second, the Registered Person failed to do that in relation to the tendering process, (whether a formal or relatively informal process) or before undertaking any role regarding supervision during the construction phase.

46. The Committee is satisfied that it is more likely than not that there was a shared intention, although no concluded formal agreement, that the Registered Person would engage in and provide professional services to the Referrer during both those processes. The Committee accepts the Referrer’s evidence on this point because it is consistent with the fact that the Registered Person involved himself in both these stages without any formal agreement. In respect of the Registered Person’s involvement in the supervision stage the Committee found that this was consistent with the contemporaneous documentation, namely a text or WhatsApp message, referred to above in which the Referrer wrote of a discussion she had had with the Registered Person about the various ways in which he might undertake such work and the Registered Persons reply that “I will be there to assist you on all matters going forward”.

47. There is no dispute that the result of this is that the Registered Person was involved in both stages without any written agreement complying with Standard 4.4. Mr Wygas submitted that the work carried out at those two stages was not carried out in breach of standard 4.4 because that work was carried out “pro bono”, to which standard 4.4 cannot apply. In support of that submission Mr Wygas gave the example of an architect who carried out a small additional amount of work as a favour to a client being compelled to provide written terms to avoid breaching standard 4.4.

48. The Committee does not have to rule on the position of an architect in that position. In this case the Committee is satisfied that the Registered Person was not carrying out a small additional amount of work as a gesture of goodwill but was involved in these two fundamental stages in the project, namely finding a builder and supervising his work.

49. The Committee is also not persuaded that the work in question was pro bono in the proper sense that it was agreed that the Registered Person would not charge for the work. In particular with regard to the supervision stage there is written evidence that the Referrer asked for a price and the Registered Person never replied either with a price or saying that he would do the work without payment. The Committee concluded that work does not become pro bono simply because an architect does not respond to a clear request for an estimate.

50. The Committee’s view is that if an architect is carrying out a significant amount of pro bono work, he is obliged to have written terms of engagement that comply with Standard 4.4 and record that no fee is being charged.

51. Accordingly, the Committee found that the Registered Person was in breach of standard 4.4 on the wider grounds that he carried out work on two stages of the building project without any written terms of agreement complying with Standard 4.4

Particular 2a

52. The Committee observed that the focus of this Particular is the time between the grant of planning permission on 19 October 2022, and the second fee proposal relating to technical drawings sent on 22 November 2022.

53. The Committee observed that the expert witnesses did not agree on this Particular. Ms Ailward acknowledged the delay and that the Registered Person’s communication “could have been better”. Nevertheless, she believed that the over- all timescale from planning permission to the production of the drawings did not amount to undue delay because, as she explained when questioned, “there could have been a reason”.

54. Mr Smart observed that the period was too long, there was no explanation why the Registered Person could supply an invoice for his brother (as structural engineer) but not the one the Referrer required. He also pointed out the Registered Person’s failure to communicate with the Referrer about delay. He concluded that there was undue delay, but his evidence was that it “Represents a lower level of seriousness due to the relatively short time scales involved” nor did he think the time for the production of the drawings was itself unreasonable.

55. The Committee observed that the Registered Person set out at Paragraph 24 of his written statement a significant number of health and personal matters that could have explained why he took some 5 weeks to complete a task which all the evidence suggested should have been completed in a week. However, he did not address why these matters did not stop him dealing with other matters which he stated in oral evidence that he had “prioritised”. Above all, he did not address his failure to communicate with the Referrer about the delay.

56. The Committee had regard to the following matters:

i. The length of the delay – bearing in mind Mr Wygas’ submission that the Registered Person had been surprised by the early grant of planning permission.
ii. The reasons for the delay.
iii. The level of communication.
iv. The impact or potential impact of delay.

57. The Committee was particularly struck by the evidence that the Registered Person did not communicate after 19 October until chased on 9 November and did not respond to messages on 14, 18 and 21 November 2022.

58. Taking all those matters together, the Committee decided that the delay, although not the longest or most serious, did amount to undue delay.

59. Accordingly, the Committee found Particular 2a proved

Particular 2b

60. The Committee observed that the expert witnesses disagreed on this particular as well. Mr. Smart’s opinion was that the Registered Person had an obligation to provide overall timescales. Ms Ailward said that he had no obligation although architects would often do that.

61. On balance, the Committee preferred the opinion of Mr Smart because it was persuaded by the reasons that he gave. He described the failure to give advice about timescales as more than a minor failing which may have led to the Referrer having unrealistic expectations and being dissatisfied with the service provided. The Committee observed that after planning permission was granted the Referrer was under the impression that it may be possible for builders to start before Christmas when it proved not possible to even conclude a contract with the builder until February of the following year. The Committee took into account also that the Referrer had made plain to the Registered person from the outset, and continued to do so thereafter, that this project was urgent for her given the state of her father’s health.

62. The Committee acknowledges that any time estimate for a whole project given at an early stage would have to be subject to appropriate caveats including the potentially unpredictable delays in obtaining planning permission and securing a contractor. Nevertheless, the Committee is satisfied that such a time estimate, and clarity about what might be unpredictable elements of the process, would have provided this Referrer with a timescale and the necessary information to have prevented misunderstanding and discontent.
63. The Committee has concluded that the duty arose because the Committee would expect this of a competent architect and accordingly concluded that failure to do was a breach of Standard 6.1: the duty for an architect to carry out their work with “skill and care”.

64. Accordingly, the Committee found Particular 2b proved.

Particular 3

65. The Committee had regard to the Registered Person’s communication with the Referrer in the following areas:

i. The Committee has already indicated the number of occasions when the Registered Person simply failed to respond to communications from the Referrer between the grant of planning permission and the provision of the second fee proposal;
ii. The Committee also observed that the pattern of messages being unanswered continued, with five examples in January 2023 and four more in February 2023;
iii. The Committee has already indicated above, that the Registered Person did not communicate the extent of his role at the tendering process. The Committee is satisfied that that can be properly described as a failure of communication;
iv. The Committee also noted that the Registered Person received a message from the Referrer on 25 January 2023 asking him to send her an estimate for the different ways he could supervise the building work;
v. The Committee observed that his response, “I will be there to assist you on all matters going forward” did not address any of the questions she raised about the extent of his involvement or the cost;
vi. The Committee also observed that the Referrer finally terminated the Registered Person’s services on 14 March 2023 after she had asked his advice about a problem on site, he had promised to reply by 2.00pm that day and he had failed to communicate with her.

66. Taking those matters together, the Committee concluded that the relationship between the Registered Person and the Referrer was characterised by inadequate and at times non-existent communication from the Registered Person between the time planning permission was granted until their working relationship ended. The Committee found that this was a particularly serious failing because the Referrer had made it clear that urgency was important to her.

67. Accordingly, the Committee found Particular 3 proved.

Particular 4

68. The Committee acknowledged that the division between the appointment of the builder and preparation of the contract is artificial. Nonetheless, the Committee has followed this division in deference to the drafting of the Particulars of Allegation.

69. The Committee reminded itself that the ARB alleged a breach of the following Standards of the Code:

       6.1 You are expected to carry out your work with skill and care and in accordance with the terms of your engagement.

       6.4 You should, when acting between parties or giving advice, exercise impartial and independent professional judgment.

70. Mr Wygas submitted to the Committee that Particulars 4 and 6 are serious allegations and it is important that the Registered Person is not unfairly ambushed by having to meet allegations that were not clear in advance. Mr Wygas drew the Committee’s attention to Thaker v SRA [2011] EWHC 660 (Admin) in support of the proposition that a regulator must set out the allegations with sufficient clarity.

71. The Committee has already observed that there is a need for caution in this case because the particulars of allegation are narrower than the original complaint (and a significant amount of the evidence put before the Committee). In particular, the Committee reminded itself that the ARB has not put any of the allegations on the basis of the way the work was carried out after January 2023 or the way the Registered Person supervised it. Nor is part of the ARB’s case that any advice the Registered Person gave the Referrer about the building estimates she had received was wrong. The Committee does not accept Mr Wygas’ submission that it must proceed on the basis that both were carried out satisfactorily, because there is no evidence of that either. The Committee has proceeded on the basis that those matters are simply not part of the allegations that the Registered Person must meet.

72. For the avoidance of doubt, the Committee has also observed that it is not part of the allegation against the Registered Person that it was he who suggested cash payments to the Referrer or that he put any pressure on the Referrer to pay in cash. Insofar as that was part of the Referrer’s evidence, the Committee proceeded on the basis that was something the Committee did not have to decide except in so far as it affects what, if any, advice the Registered Person should have given the Referrer.

Particular 4a

73. The Committee observed that there is no dispute that the Registered Person recommended the builder in November 2022.

74. The Committee reminded itself that the allegation in the Report submitted that there were concerns “as to whether the Registered Person acted appropriately and/or impartially in advising the Registered Person to appoint Andreas Dauti. Mr. Smart notes that before making a recommendation of a builder, an architect should ensure, so as to comply with the CDM Regulations, that the builder proposed has the required skills, knowledge and experience for the project. In this case, Mr. Smart raises serious doubts as to the builder that was recommended and appointed. Firstly, he notes that the quote provided by the builder had no postal address, no email address, no company name and no VAT number.”
75. Both experts agreed that the Registered Person had an obligation to take reasonable care and skill in the recommendation of a builder. The fundamental question at this stage was whether it was sufficient that the Registered Person had formed a favourable view of the builder whilst working with him on a project or whether he needed to make independent inquiries about his financial and legal status.

76. The Committee concluded that the recommendation of a builder based on personal experience of working with him, was not inappropriate within the context of a domestic project of this type. The Committee acknowledged that the builder’s estimate was not on headed paper and did not contain all the information that should be in the final contract but was not persuaded that was sufficient reason to say that the recommendation was itself inappropriate.

77. The Committee also looked at the Registered Person’s conduct in arranging to introduce his recommended builder to the Referrer, making drawings available to a different builder and answering that builder’s questions by email whilst dealing with his recommended builder by phone.

78. Taking all the evidence as a whole, the Committee was not satisfied that the ARB had demonstrated that the Registered Person had not exercised skill and care in recommending a builder or behaved inappropriately to favour the builder he recommended at the expense of another builder.

79. Accordingly, the Committee found Particular 4a not proved

Particular 4b

80. The builder was chosen by the Referrer, on her evidence, because she thought the Registered Person would communicate better with him and they would work more smoothly together. She was also influenced by price and the builder’s assurance that he could complete the work in 6 months.
81. The Referrer had negotiated a contract sum. When questioned about this, the Referrer said that the Registered Person had confirmed to her when they met that the price was based on cash payment and she assumed that this may have been so that the builder avoided paying some tax, but she felt that this was none of her business.

82. The correspondence shows that another builder had suggested to the Referrer that she should ask questions about compensation for any delays in the building works that might arise.

83. Against this background the ARB submit that the contract was inappropriate for the following reasons:

i. The insurances section was left blank, which left the Referrer vulnerable in case of a claim;
ii. There was no address for the builder (to which any correspondence, including a legal claim, could have been sent), and a lack of clarity about the legal entity of the builder;
iii. The schedule of payments was not actually attached to the contract but rather appears to have been produced later. The Registered Person said in oral evidence that he “specified deposit and retention and rationalised rest of money by weeks” and “I just worked out number of weeks and divided it. I decided weekly basis to allow contractor cashflow.” He also agreed that this was not something he spoke to the Referrer about at the time;
iv. There is no reference to the contract drawings in the contract;
v. There is no provision for liquidated damages, in case of delay;
vi. The payment arrangements: approximately £8,000 per week in cash with no regard to the scope of work actually carried out nor the quality of that work;
vii. (At paragraph 115 of the Report) the ARB submits that the Registered Person failed to act appropriately and/or impartially to advise his client in respect of the appointment of the builder, the building contract and the appointment of the structural engineer. His client was a lay individual who relied on the Registered Person’s advice; that advice exposed the Referrer to significant risk particularly in respect of the appointment of the builder.

84. Mr Wygas submitted that the Committee cannot rely upon a more general failure to advise the Referrer because paragraph 115 of the ARB report must be read as referring only to the Registered Person’s failure to advise the Referrer of her obligations under the CDM regulations to ensure that the site is safe. He submitted that this was a breach that the Registered Person admitted but which was unimportant because in a domestic project the obligations were automatically borne by the building contractor.

85. The Committee has already indicated its concern to ensure that any allegation was clearly notified to the Registered Person and based upon matters that he was aware of in advance. The Committee is satisfied that, on this point, Mr. Wygas’ approach is an over- technical way of approaching fairness in a regulatory setting. The Committee is satisfied that the essence of the allegation that the Registered Person must meet was sufficiently clear so that the Registered Person is not disadvantaged.

86. The Committee was satisfied that this issue was sufficiently clear in advance such that both experts were able to deal with it in their joint statement of opinion. The Committee observed that both experts agreed that where the Registered Person provides a form of contract he had “a duty to see that the building contract was properly prepared or recommend that it was properly completed and to advise the Referrer of the general provisions therein.”

87. The Committee read the contract, in light of the matters set out above and the admitted situation that the Registered Person had drafted the payment schedule without consulting the Referrer and without advising her that the combination of regular payments and the very short intervals between them, would make supervision of the work difficult.

88. Taking all these matters together the Committee was satisfied that the Registered Person prepared a contract without paying proper attention to the terms set out in it or in some cases not set out. Nor did he sufficiently draw the Referrer’s attention to the key terms and give advice about their implications.

89. The Committee concluded that this fell significantly below what was to be expected of a reasonably competent architect and represented a breach of standard 6.1 and was accordingly inappropriate.

90. The Committee then considered whether the ARB had established that the Registered Person had not acted impartially in respect of the preparation of the building contract.

91. The Committee again reminded itself that there was no evidence before it of any improper relationship between the Registered Person and the builder and the ARB did not rely upon any subsequent performance of the contract by either the Registered Person (apart from a failure of communication) or the builder after the contract was signed in February 2023.

92. The Committee already indicated that it found that the Registered Person failed in his duty to the Referrer by reason of the terms of the contract and the lack of advice that he gave. Nevertheless, the Committee is aware that the Referrer had an agreement regarding price and time scales that she apparently valued.

93. Taking the position as a whole, the Committee is not satisfied that the Registered Person disadvantaged the Referrer for either his benefit or that of the builder. Therefore, the Committee does not find that the Registered Person did not act impartially.

94. Accordingly, the Committee finds 4b proved with regard to “not act appropriately” but not proved with regard to the allegation that the Registered Person did not act impartially.

Particular 6

95. Having found that the ARB had not established that the Registered Person failed to act impartially the Committee decided that there was not a proper basis to find that the Registered Person had acted without integrity.

Unacceptable Professional Conduct (UPC)

96. Having found particulars 1, 2a and 2b, 3, and 4b, of the Allegation proved, the Committee went on to consider whether the Registered Person’s conduct amounted to UPC.

Submissions and advice

97. The Committee heard submissions from Ms Crine and Mr Wygas.

98. Ms Crine set out the relevant law and standards to which the Committee refers below. She reminded the Committee that the general standard is whether the conduct found proved falls seriously short of that expected by an architect.

99. With regard to Particular 1, she reminded the Committee that it had found that the Registered Person was in breach of standard 4.4 and submitted that the breaches were more than technical and shaped the Referrer’s experience of the Registered Person and her expectations of him and the building project. She submitted that the Registered Person’s failures led to confusion about his role and responsibilities.

100. With regard to Particular 2a, Ms Crine acknowledged that Mr Smart had given evidence that this breach fell at the lower end of the scale of seriousness. Nevertheless, she submitted that the matters found proved by the Committee added to the picture of confusion.

101. With regard to Particular 2b, she submitted that the Registered Person’s failure to provide time scales was a breach of standard 6.1 and submitted that its seriousness lay in the effect it had on the project as a whole and contributed to the Referrer’s expectations and ultimately affected her trust in the Registered Person. She submitted that this breach was also aggravated by the Referrer’s vulnerability, which the Registered Person recognised.

102. With regard to Particular 3, Ms Crine submitted that the Registered Person’s failure to communicate was a breach of standard 6.3 and it was serious because of all the consequences which the Committee had set out in its decision on facts.

103. With regard to Particular 4b, Ms Crine submitted that the Registered Person’s failures with respect to the contract were serious for all the reasons set out in the Committee’s findings and were aggravated because of the Referrer’s lack of experience, the impact this had on the project and her perception of the architect. It was not, she submitted, part of the ARB’s case that the matters that gave rise to the termination of the relationship with him and the builder were his fault but his failings in this regard gave rise to her perception that the Registered Person was at fault and letting her down.

104. Mr Wygas reminded the Committee that to make a finding of UPC the Committee must find that the conduct found proved against the Registered Person is serious. He drew the Committee’s attention to authorities which are set out in the Committees decision.

105. Mr Wygas Indicated that he had no submissions to make with regard to Particular 1.

106. With regard to Particular 2a, Mr Wygas reminded the Committee that the ARB had put the case against the Registered Person on the basis that this matter was not serious and accordingly he submitted should not form part of any finding of UPC.
107. With regard to Particular 2b, Mr Wygas reminded the Committee of its findings at the fact stage that any advice about time scales would have had to be very heavily caveated and there were many uncertainties. He submitted that, in those circumstances the matters proved cannot amount to UPC.

108. With regard to Particulars 3 he submitted that the matters found proved could not amount to UPC because they were too vague and this had led the Committee to finds matters proved that extended beyond the ARB’s “pleaded case”.

109. Mr Wygas did not make any submissions regarding Particular 4b except to observe that the Committee had found a breach of Standard 6.1 when the ARB had pleaded a breach of 6.4.

110. The Committee followed the advice of the Chair in its approach, which is set out below.

The Committee’s approach

111. It reminded itself that a finding of UPC is a matter for its own independent judgment having regard to any facts found proved. There is no burden or standard of proof. Nor can there be a finding of UPC by admission.

112. The Committee noted that UPC is defined in section 14(1)(a) of the Architects Act 1997 as conduct which falls short of the standard required of an Architect.

113. The Committee bore in mind the ARB guidance that UPC is defined as conduct which falls short of the standard required of a Registered Person. In reaching its findings on UPC, the Committee recognised that not every shortcoming on the part of an Architect, nor failure to comply with the provisions of the Code, will necessarily give rise to disciplinary proceedings or a finding of UPC.

114. The general test is whether he or she has fallen seriously short of the standard of conduct expected of a member of the profession in the circumstances.

115. The conduct found proved must be serious in order for unacceptable professional conduct to be found. The question of what is serious or not in the context is not a technical legal exercise but a question for the skilled judgment of the Professional Conduct Committee.

116. In deciding whether the facts found proved amount to UPC the Committee also had regard to Spencer v General Osteopathic Council [2012] EWHC 3147 (Admin). It bore in mind in reaching its decision that for a finding of UPC to be made, “a degree of moral blameworthiness on the part of the registrant likely to convey a degree of opprobrium to the ordinary intelligent citizen” was required. (The Committee observed that this is old fashioned language meaning that they would regard it as disgraceful).

117. The Committee also took into account the observation made by Kerr J in Shaw v The General Osteopathic Council [2015] EWHC 2721 (Admin) that, although the conduct in question must be sufficiently serious, it does not need to be of such gravity that imposing an admonishment would be too lenient.

118. The Committee followed the approach set out in Solicitors Regulation Authority v. Day and others [2018] EWHC 2726 (Admin) (as case about serious professional misconduct) which gave the following guidance to Committees: “We do not, we emphasise, say that there is a set standard of seriousness or culpability for the purposes of assessing breaches of the core principles in tribunal proceedings. It is a question of fact and degree in each case. Whether the default in question is sufficiently serious and culpable thus will depend on the particular core principle in issue and on the evaluation of the circumstances of the particular case as applied to that principle.”

119. The Committee also had regard to the case of Vranicki v Architects Registration Board [2007] EWHC 506 (Admin), which provided that the Committee should look at the picture as a whole when deciding SPI, and by implication, UPC.

The Committee’s decision

120. The Committee had regard to its findings at the fact stage, the submissions it heard, the Code and the guidance referred to above.

121. In order to assess the seriousness of the conduct in this case, the Committee examined each of the matters found proved in turn.

122. With regard to Particular 1, the Committee found that this amounted to conduct which fell seriously short of that expected of an architect not only because the two written documents, referred to as fee proposal 1 and fee proposal 2 in the facts determination, omitted important matters regarding the Referrer’s right to terminate the contract, a complaints procedure and the Registered Person’s registration with the ARB, but also because the Committee found that the Registered Person’s failure extended to the selection of a building contractor and supervision of the work. In these latter cases, there was no written agreement and hence a failure to set out “who will be responsible for what” and “Any constraints or limitations on the responsibilities of the parties”. This was of particular importance in the context of this case.

123. For these reasons the Committee found that these matters made a significant contribution to a finding of UPC.

124. With regard to Particular 2a the Committee acknowledged that Mr Smart had not identified this as a serious failing and the case had been put by the ARB on the basis that it was not. In those circumstances the Committee did not find it amounted to UPC of itself.
125. The Committee reminded itself that the most significant plank in its finding of “undue delay” was the Registered Person’s failure to communicate the Referrer any of the personal difficulties he was experiencing. In those circumstances, the Committee decided that this failure was subsumed within Particular 3 in any event.

126. With regard to Particular 2b, the Committee found that the failure to give overall time scales must be seen in the context of its finding that any advice given would have been heavily caveated and would be more fairly considered as a failure of communication to be assessed at Particular 3.

127. With regard to Particular 3, the Committee reminded itself of its findings at paragraph 65 of the facts determination. The Registered Person’s failing set out there included failing to respond to messages, failing to communicate the extent of his role and responsibilities at important stages of the building work and in particular a failure to respond to the Referrer’s request for a fee quotation and an explanation of the way in which he would assist with the supervision of the building work.

128. The Committee is satisfied that these findings are not vague but clear and serious failures of communication which do contribute significantly towards the finding of UPC.

129. With regard to Particular 4b, the Committee reminded itself of its findings at paragraph 88 of the decision at the facts stage (and the reference to the detailed matters listed at paragraph 83). The Committee was satisfied that these matters were not vague but clear and serious breaches of the Registered Person’s duty when proposing a form of contract to a domestic client. The Committee is satisfied that it makes no difference to the seriousness or fairness of those findings whether they are characterised as a breach of standards 6.1 ( You are expected to carry out your work with skill and care and in accordance with the terms of your engagement or 6.3 (You are expected to keep your client informed of the progress of work you undertake on their behalf and of any issue which may significantly affect its quality or cost.) of the code. Accordingly, the Committee was satisfied that these matters amounted to UPC and played a significant part in the overall picture.

130. For the avoidance of doubt, the Committee records that it was satisfied that all these failings were aggravated by the effect they had on a vulnerable domestic client in the way set out by Ms Crine in her submissions.

131. For these reasons, the Committee found the allegation of UPC proved against the Registered Person.

Decision On Sanction

132. Having found the Registered Person’s actions amounted to UPC, the Committee then went on to consider what, if any, sanction to impose in this case.

Submissions and advice

133. The Committee heard submissions from Ms Crine and from Mr Wygas. Neither called further evidence, although Mr Wygas put before the Committee five testimonials and a document that was a template for the Registered Person’s “Architectural Services Agreement.”

134. Ms Crine drew the Committee’s attention to the Professional Conduct Committee Sanctions Guidance (the Guidance) and the approach which Committees are recommended to take to sanction. She reminded the Committee of the five sanctions available to it.

135. Ms Crine submitted that there were the following aggravating factors in this case:

i. The Registered Person’s UPC had a significant effect on the Referrer;
ii. There was a pattern of poor conduct in that the Registered Person’s UPC had continued from June 2022 to March 2023;
iii. There was a lack of sufficient insight or remorse, in particular because the Registered Person had argued that he had no obligations to the Referrer at important times when the Committee had found he did;
iv. With regard to the preparation of the contract he had accepted he should have kept the Referrer updated but denied doing anything wrong;
v. The Registered Person’s UPC had affected a vulnerable client.

136. Ms Crine acknowledged that the Registered Person had experienced difficult personal circumstances in November and December 2022, was a man of good character.

137. Mr Wygas made the following preliminary submissions:

i. The Committee’s findings on UPC could properly be characterised as finding UPC on the basis of only two matters: a failure to provide adequate terms of engagement and the preparation of the contract;
ii. The Registered Person had not “abandoned” the Referrer but, to the contrary, had supervised the building work on her house for no fee and because he cared about his work;
iii. The consequences of the Registered Person’s UPC were restricted to causing confusion. In particular, the Committee had acknowledged that the failure to set out time scales had no particular consequences. He submitted that the Referrer had made changes to the plans and it had not been found that the Registered Person had caused delay;
iv. Lessons have been learned. It was, he submitted, fully accepted that there was a need for a proper “retainer” document and the Committee had been provided with the template for the document which the Registered Person now uses;
v. There was also evidence in the Registered Person’s witness statement that he had developed an understanding of the importance of communication and making sure he had sufficient time to deal with his work. He no longer recommended contractors, and he was careful to ensure that he maintained proper client architect boundaries and in particular all work would have a fee associated with it so that the client’s expectations were better managed.

138. Turning to the potential aggravating factors, Mr Wygas submitted that:

i. The issue of substantial risk of harm did not arise in this case and the outcome was that there were no serious consequences;
ii. A pattern of misconduct was not made out;
iii. The Registered Person had not failed to engage with the ARB;
iv. It was apparent from the Registered Person’s witness statement that he had taken remedial steps and did not lack insight or remorse;
v. There had been no findings of or akin to dishonesty;
vi. It was not right to categorise the Referrer as a vulnerable client when she was herself a professional person and had participated fully in the project including terminating the agreements with both the Registered Person and the builder.

139. With regard to mitigating factors, Mr Wygas submitted that the Committee should have regard to:

i. The Registered Person’s personal circumstances, set out in his witness statement;
ii. Admissions made by the Registered Person at the outset;
iii. The Registered Person’s good character.

140. Turning to the individual sanctions, Mr Wygas submitted that this was an exceptional case, where it would be appropriate to impose no sanction. He submitted that the Committee should take into account that the Registered Person had faced serious allegations of lack of integrity and undisclosed payments which had continued until recently. He had fully engaged in the process including a nine day hearing. There had been no harm to the public nor had serious harm to the Referrer being identified.
141. With regard to a reprimand, he submitted that the UPC in this case did not cross the line into that category because the Registered Person had shown remorse and genuine insight.

142. He submitted that it was not necessary to address the Committee on any other sanctions.

143. The Committee received the advice of the Chair, which it accepted and followed in its approach set out below.

The Committee’s Approach

144. In reaching its decision, the Committee had regard to all the evidence provided to it and took into account the submissions made by Ms Crine and Mr Wygas. The Committee had regard to and applied the Guidance. It also had regard to the Committee’s decision on facts and its findings in relation to UPC.

145. The Committee reminded itself that the primary purpose of sanctions is to protect members of the public, to maintain the integrity of the profession, and to declare and uphold proper standards of conduct and competence. It has borne in mind that the purpose of imposing a sanction is not to be punitive although it may have a punitive effect.

146. The Committee reminded itself that one result of that may be that matters of personal mitigation will be of less importance than they would be if the object were punishment. The Committee reminded itself of the principle laid down by the case of Bolton v Law Society [1994] 1 WLR 512 ‘The reputation of the profession is more important than the fortunes of any individual member. Membership of a profession brings many benefits, but that is part of the price.’

147. The Committee reminded itself that it must have regard to the principle of proportionality, that is to say that it must strike a proper balance between public protection and the rights of the Registered Person. Nevertheless, if a sanction is necessary for the protection of the public including in the wider public interest, it must be imposed. A sanction should be no more severe or restrictive than is necessary to achieve its aim.

148. The Committee reminded itself that it should identify any aggravating and mitigating factors and balance those factors to arrive at a view of the seriousness of the unacceptable professional conduct it had found.

149. The Committee acknowledged that it should consider each sanction in turn starting with the least restrictive and reminded itself that the sanctions available are as follows, bearing in mind that a Committee can, in appropriate circumstances, impose no sanction:

i. Reprimand
ii. Penalty order
iii. Suspension
iv. Erasure

The Committee’s decision

150. The Committee identified the following aggravating factors:

i. The Committee has already identified the substantial risk of harm to the Referrer because of the omissions from the contract with the builder including, the payment schedule of weekly payments to the builder regardless of the progress or quality of the work. The Committee was satisfied that this was compounded by failures of communication and lack of clarity about the Registered Person’s role at important stages. For these reasons, the Committee was satisfied that there was a significant risk of harm to the Referrer and the wider public’s confidence in the profession.
ii. The Committee found that the Registered Person’s UPC was repeated in different forms over a period of several months. Nevertheless, the Committee observed that it was confined to a single project for one client. In those circumstances the Committee concluded that it was not right to characterise the Registered Person’s UPC as a pattern of poor conduct although it was right to record that Registered Person’s misconduct had been repeated on a number of occasions.

151. The Committee wishes to record that it was not persuaded that the Referrer was a vulnerable person, in the sense intended in the Guide. The Committee acknowledged that the Referrer was inexperienced in building projects and was under some personal and emotional pressure to complete the work. The Committee observed that this is commonly the position of domestic clients.

152. Nevertheless, the Referrer was a professional person who played a full role in negotiating contracts and ensuring that the work was done as she wished. The Committee is satisfied that she was let down by the Registered Person upon whom she relied, but that is not to say that she was herself vulnerable.

153. The Committee identified the following mitigating factors:

i. The Registered Person’s good character;
ii. Some admissions made at an early stage;
iii. The limited evidence that the Registered Person was normally a competent architect. The Committee was able to give some weight to the testimonials, although they gave little detail. The Committee observed that the Registered Person was recommended to the Referrer, albeit by someone who had experienced his inadequate communication;
iv. Some steps towards improving his practice by the use of better terms of engagement.

154. Before leaving the question of aggravating and mitigating factors, the Committee wishes to record that it had considered the question of insight and remediation and found that the evidence before it was insufficient for it to be able to conclude that it was either an aggravating or mitigating factor.

155. The Committee acknowledged that the Registered Person has reflected on the need to use appropriate terms of engagement, maintain professional boundaries and be clear about fees.

156. However, there is no material before the Committee to satisfy it that the Registered Person has understood the impact of his UPC upon the Referrer, the reasons that the contract he chose, with weekly payments in cash and parts including insurance uncompleted, exposed her to risks. Nor has he demonstrated an understanding the impact that this inadequate service would have on public confidence in architects. The Committee cannot accept Mr Wygas’ submission that the public would think the Registered Person to be, above all, kind because of how he worked for the Referrer without asking for payment. The Committee’s view is that a member of the public is more likely to think that the Registered Person was careless and disorganised and in the Committee’s judgment that could have an effect upon public confidence in the profession.

157. The Committee balanced the aggravating and mitigating factors and concluded that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors because, there was not sufficient material to outweigh the seriousness of unacceptable professional conduct over several months giving rise to the results and risks set out above.

158. Against this background, the Committee considered each of the sanctions in turn. The Committee considered first whether it should impose no sanction. The Committee had regard to paragraph 6.1 of the Guidance and concluded that this case was too serious to impose no sanction. The Committee was unable to accept Mr Wygas’ submissions that the matters he raised were sufficient to amount to exceptional circumstances. The Committee observed that the strain upon the Registered Person is a common feature of the regulatory process.

159. The Committee then considered imposing a reprimand. The Committee had regard to the matters set out in paragraph 6.2 of the Guidance. The Committee concluded that this was not a matter that fell at the lower end of the scale of seriousness and reminded itself that the UPC found in this case could not be described as an isolated incident. The Committee was also satisfied that the UPC in this case had seriously affected the Referrer at a difficult time in her life by causing her distress and anxiety. The Committee has already recorded the risk of further harm and the risk to the reputation of the profession.

160. The Committee then considered a penalty order, that is to say a financial penalty of up to £2500. The Committee concluded that, this sanction was open to the Committee, in particular, because it had already found that the failings were too serious to warrant a reprimand and the evidence of insight or remorse is limited.

161. In order to ensure that the Committee was not failing to protect the public by imposing a penalty order the Committee considered whether a suspension order was needed in this case. The Committee considered the criteria set out at paragraph 6.4 and concluded that the UPC in this case is not so serious that a penalty order would be insufficient to protect the public or uphold public confidence in the profession. The Committee was satisfied that a suspension order should be reserved for matters that were more serious and closer to requiring an erasure order.

162. With these reasons the Committee decided to impose a penalty order. The Committee decided that the correct amount of that order £2,000, to reflect that this is a serious matter but not at the very top of the UPC for which a penalty order could be imposed, having regard to the mitigation available to the Registered Person.

163. Accordingly, the Committee imposes a Penalty Order in the sum of £2,000.