Mr Lekia Lebari-Orleans

THE ARCHITECTS REGISTRATION BOARD

PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT COMMITTEE

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In the matter of:

LEKIA LEBARI- ORLEANS (082803C)

Held via video conference on:

3 to 11 July 2025

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Present:

Andrew Lewis (Legally Qualified Chair)

David Mulligan (Architect Member)

Paul Grant (Lay Member)

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In this case, the ARB was represented by Ms Yasmin Omotosho, (“the Presenter”), Counsel, instructed by Kingsley Napley LLP.

Mr Lebari- Orleans (“the Registered Person”) attended the hearing and was not represented.

Allegation

1. The allegation made against Mr Lekia Lebari-Orleans (“the Registered Person”) is that he is guilty of Unacceptable Professional Conduct and/or Serious Professional Incompetence.

The Architects Registration Board (“the ARB”) relies upon the following particulars in support of the allegation:

1. The Registered Person failed to adequately communicate with the client in relation to a planning application.

2. The Registered Person failed to complete a service for which he had received upfront payment.

3. The Registered Person did not act appropriately following the termination of his engagement by making demands for payment from the Referrer which were excessive.

4. The Registered Person’s actions at particulars 1 and/or 2:
a. were misleading; and/or
b. lacked integrity; and/or
c. were dishonest.

5. The Registered Person’s actions at particular 3:
a. lacked integrity; and/or
b. were dishonest.

Background

2. The Registered Person is a registered Architect, who has run his own practice, known as Octo Architects, since 2019. He employs three architectural assistants and a small administrative staff.

3. Ms Webb and Mr Ludsten (“the Referrers”) purchased a property in Liverpool (“the Property”) in February 2023. The property is a detached garden house built in the late 1960s located in the suburbs of north Liverpool.

4. The Referrers wished to remodel the house including the removal of many of the walls downstairs to create an open-plan space, convert the garage into a utility room, relocate the downstairs toilet and kitchen, and convert the glazed porch into a habitable space by extending the entrance hall. They also had plans regarding heating and ventilation.

5. The Referrers and the Registered Person established contact at the end of March 2023. He was one of four architects considered by the Referrers and, after meeting and an exchange of several emails, they entered into a written agreement on 21 April 2023. The details of the contractual arrangement between the Referrers and the Registered Person are referred to below where necessary.

6. By 24 July 2023, the project had progressed to the point where the Registered Person wrote to Ms Webb (“the Referrer”) that “we will get the planning application submitted tomorrow”. He invited them to a meeting to discuss the internal layout and suggested 3 August 2023.

7. The following day, on 26 July 2023, the Registered Person wrote an email to the Referrers which began as follows:

“Please find attached invoice 2 which is due upon submission of planning application.
Your planning application has now been submitted and you should today receive an email providing you with options to make payment to Sefton Council.”

8. On 26 July 2023, at 19.37 the Referrers responded to the Registered Person’s email, stating “thanks for submitting the planning application today. We haven’t received anything from Sefton yet, but when we do we will pay them and your invoice.”

9. On 28th July the Referrers wrote to the Registered Person saying “we haven’t received an email from Sefton Council about paying the application fee. Do you have a reference number so we can double check they’ve got it okay and make payment?”

10. On Sunday 30 July 2023 the Registered Person replied in an email written at 10.08 pm, in which he said:

“Apologies, I realise from my email that I wasn’t particularly clear. The submitting of the application is tied to the pre-agreed milestone for our invoice payment. This may seem a little bit draconian but we’ve been left behind on projects before so we have to request the payment upon submission of the planning application.
If you can clear the payment tomorrow we can push the button on the application.”

11. By email on 31 July 2023, the Referrers terminated their agreement with Octo Architects, citing loss of trust in Octo Architects and saying:

“You have today pressured us to pay you prior to submission. Last week you lied about having submitted the planning application. It would appear that you wanted to give the appearance last week that we were paying after submission.”

12. The Referrers made a formal written complaint to the ARB on 19 August 2023.

13. While the issues were being investigated by the ARB, the Registered Person wrote two emails to the Referrers on 5 August 2024.

14. The first email contained an allegation that the Referrers had used Octo Architect’s drawings in breach of copyright since July 2023, “requested” fees or compensation valued at £8,437.50 plus VAT, and threatened legal proceedings.

15. The second email, sent approximately 40 minutes later, claimed that invoice 2 in the sum of £1,406 plus VAT (referred to above in the email dated 26 July 2023 from the Registered Person) was still outstanding , stated that the contract between them had not been terminated in accordance with the terms of the contract and required payment of that sum plus accrued interest which totalled £54,412.20 plus VAT.

16. The Referrers sent those emails to the ARB.

Admissions

17. The Particulars of Allegation were read to the Registered Person at the start of the hearing in accordance with rule 25 (c) of the Investigations and Professional Conduct Committee Rules (the Rules).

18. The Registered Person admitted making the demands for payment alleged in Particular 3 but denied that those demands were inappropriate. The Registered Person denied all other particulars of the allegation. In those circumstances, the Committee did not record any matters as admitted and found proved in accordance with Rule 25(d).

Evidence

19. The Committee had before it a “Final Hearing Bundle” of 302 pages from the ARB which included the following:

i. The written statement of the ARB’s case
ii. Two written statements of the Referrer,
iii. Email correspondence between the Registered Person and the Referrers,
iv. The written agreement between the Registered Person and the Referrers dated 21 April 2023 (the contract),
v. The Registered Person’s response the Particulars of Allegation,
vi. A letter from a former colleague of the Registered Person.

20. The Committee also received a bundle of documents from the Registered Person which included the following:

i. The Registered Person’s defence comprising 44 pages,
ii. 46 Appendices.

Submissions and advice

21. The Committee heard evidence from one of the Referrers (Ms Webb) and from the Registered Person. The Committee refers to their evidence in more detail where that is relevant to its decision in respect of each Particular of the Allegation.

22. The Committee received submissions on facts from the Presenter, in which she drew the Committee’s attention to the relevant law and evidence. The Committee also received submissions from the Registered Person.

23. The Committee refers to those submissions, where relevant when setting out its decision in respect of each Particular of the Allegation.

24. The Committee also received legal advice from the Chair, which it followed in its approach to the allegations. The Committee summarises that advice as follows.

25. The Chair advised the Committee that the burden of proof lies on the ARB and the standard of proof is the balance of probabilities. The Registered Person does not have to prove or disprove anything.

26. The Committee must not speculate but can draw inferences from facts it has found proved. When drawing an inference, it should set out the fact it has found proved, the inferences it has drawn and explain why it has drawn them.

27. The Committee does not have to resolve every disputed fact in this case only those that are necessary to enable it to reach a decision on the Particulars of the Allegation.

28. Where the Committee must interpret the contract between the Referrers and the Registered Person it should interpret the written document for itself and not rely upon the views of the contracting parties who may have come to incorrect and conflicting views of what the contract provided.

29. When assessing the evidence of witnesses, the Committee should remember that memory is fallible and not place undue reliance upon demeanour. It should compare the evidence of witnesses with contemporaneous documents and start from the position that such documents are likely to be the most reliable source of evidence.

30. When assessing the Registered Person’s evidence, the Committee should remember that he is a man against whom there have been no previous findings of dishonesty and of whom a number of people speak highly. The Committee should weigh that in his favour when assessing his evidence and the likelihood that he would act dishonestly.

31. Misleading simply means something which is likely to make the person hearing or reading it to believe something that is not correct.

32. With regard to dishonesty, the Committee should bear in mind the following.

Dishonesty

33. Dishonesty is a question of fact like any other. The burden of proving it rests upon the ARB and the standard of proof is the balance of probabilities. There is no enhanced standard of proof although the Committee will of course approach such a serious allegation with the care that it merits and, if it makes a finding of dishonesty it will identify the evidence upon which it relies and explain why it leads the Committee to that conclusion.

34. There is seldom direct evidence of dishonesty. It is something upon which the Committee is invited to draw an inference from the facts it has found. Everything in the advice identifying the fact found and explaining why the Committee draws an inference applies in particular on this question.

35. The test the Tribunal must apply has been set out by the Supreme Court in Ivey v Genting Casinos (UK) Ltd 2017 UKSC 67 Para (74)

“When dishonesty is in question the fact-finding tribunal must first ascertain-(subjectively) the actual state of the individual’s knowledge or belief as to the facts
The reasonableness or otherwise of his belief is a matter of evidence (often in practice determinative) going to whether he held the belief, but it is not an additional requirement that his belief must be reasonable; the question is whether it is genuinely held. When once his actual state of mind as to knowledge or belief as to facts is established, the question whether his conduct was honest or dishonest is to be determined by the fact-finder by applying the (objective) standards of ordinary decent people. There is no requirement that the defendant must appreciate that what he has done is, by those standards, dishonest.”

Integrity

36. Turning to integrity, the Committee received and accepted the following advice derived from the Court of Appeal’s decision in Wingate and Evans -v- SRA and SRA -v- Malins [2018] EWCA Civ 366: “In professional codes of conduct, the term “integrity” is a useful shorthand to express the higher standards which society expects from professional persons and which the professions expect from their own members. … The underlying rationale is that the professions have a privileged and trusted role in society. In return they are required to live up to their own professional standards.”

Particular 1 and Particular 4: evidence and submissions

37. Regarding Particular 1, the Committee was satisfied the relevant communication “in relation to a planning application” was contained in the emails set out above and sent by the Registered Person on 26 and 30 July 2023. The Committee’s attention was drawn to the pre contract emails and other communication regarding the Contract. The Committee acknowledged that not every line is a model of clarity and consistency. Nevertheless, the contemporaneous correspondence indicates that the parties were content until July 2023, and the Registered Person was making conscientious efforts to submit the planning application and communicating his intention to the Referrers.

38. There is no dispute that on 26 July 2023, the Registered Person sent the email referred to in the background set out above. The Committee observed that it was a relatively long email dealing not only with the submission of the planning application and the payment of invoice 2 but also with plans for future meetings and further work on the project. It appears to have been carefully constructed. It is also not in dispute, that the planning Application to which it referred had not in fact been submitted and the Referrers received no communication from Sefton Council.

39. In the Committee’s view, it is clear that the sentence “Your planning application has now been submitted and you should today receive an email providing you with options to make payment to Sefton Council.” is misleading.

40. The Referrer gave clear evidence, which the Committee accepted, that she took the email at face value and waited for an email from Sefton Council. When she received none, she made further enquiries of the Registered Person.

41. The Committee observed that the Registered Person did not seek to pretend that the application had been submitted but wrote, as set out above, that he had not communicated clearly and explained that he would not submit it until invoice 2 had been paid. He did not set out in correspondence with the Referrers, which provisions of the contract he relied upon.

42. The Committee also observed that, in the email of 30 July 2023, although the Registered Person acknowledged that the planning application had not been submitted, he did not touch upon how he had come to say this when it was not true or what mistake he had made and how.

43. In his written and oral evidence to the Committee, the Registered Person acknowledged that the email was indeed misleading and described it as “a terrible miscommunication on my part that the act had been carried out”. He went on to explain that his communication had been “incorrect” and when he wrote “submitted” he meant uploaded onto the system requiring only for the client to pay the fee for it to become an effective application. He added he did not mean to mislead the client but was just trying to be positive and was “a bit lazy.”

44. The Registered Person added on a number of occasions that he was aware that the planning application had not been submitted but did not want the client to understand that it had been. He explained how he had been setting up the planning application the previous day when he had been at home ill. He acknowledged that it was not true that the planning application had been submitted but said it was “a slip of words.” He said he had meant in the email that all the documents are submitted but the application was only uploaded and ready for submission. He concluded his evidence on this point by saying that he was telling the client something had been done but it was not dishonest. It was an error.

45. As far as the use of the word “submitted” is concerned the Committee could not accept that the Registered Person meant uploaded and ready for submission (which the Committee entirely accepts that he had done) because he informed the Referrers in that email that they would soon receive an email from the local authority and that would only happen after submission in the full sense.

46. The Registered Person was questioned about his possible motivation for being untruthful to the Referrer. He was asked if he intended to ensure that his invoice 2 was paid before the planning application was made without having to have a “difficult conversation” with his clients. He acknowledged that he did believe that he was entitled to have that invoice paid before the planning application was submitted and showed the Committee how he believed the contract provided for that. He acknowledged that he had not pointed this out to the Referrer but denied that he was thinking ahead to deceive them into making the payment before the application was made by telling them it had been.

47. The Committee observed that the Registered Person told the Committee on a number of occasions that he had no malicious intent in the sense of cheating the client or being paid for work that he had not done. The Committee accepted that evidence and acknowledged that despite some minor disagreements and disappointments, that may well have taken on a new significance in the light of subsequent events, the parties were content with the situation up to that point.

48. Regarding the email of 30 July 2023, the Registered Person said that he was “owning his mistake and being transparent”. He maintained that he had explained the reason he was insisting on his rights under the contract to be paid under invoice 2 before he submitted the planning application. He emphasised that he was entitled to be paid what was due on that invoice before submitting the planning application and took the Committee to the relevant paragraphs in the Contract.

49. In his closing submissions, the Registered Person invited the Committee to accept that the communication in July 2023 was the result of an error and not of dishonesty.

Findings of fact

Particular 1 (Proved)

50. The Committee considered each part of the particulars in turn. With regard to Particular 1, the Committee has already indicated that it found the email of 26th July 2023 to be entirely misleading by saying that a planning application had been submitted when it had not. It also observed that the email of 30th July 2023, whilst starting with an apology, neither acknowledged that a mistake had been made nor explained it. For those reasons the Committee concluded that the Registered Person failed to adequately communicate in relation to the planning application and found Particular 1 proved.

Particular 4 a-c (4a and c proved)

51. The Committee then went on to consider the matters set out in Particular 4 which are relevant to Particular 1. For the reasons set out above, the Committee had already found that the actions in Particular 1 were misleading.

52. The Committee then went on to consider whether the Registered Person had been dishonest. It first considered what had been his state of mind, subjectively, when he sent the e-mail of 26 July 2023

53. The Committee considered carefully the Registered Person’s explanation that he had simply made a mistake. However, it found that there was nothing in his evidence that enabled it to identify a mistake that he had made. The Committee accepted that the Registered Person wishes that he had said that the planning permission was uploaded and awaiting payment before it could be submitted but there is no basis upon which the Committee can accept that he thought that is what he had written when he sent the email for the following reasons.

i. His statement that the planning application had been submitted is clear and unambiguous;
ii. In the email, the Registered Person sets out that a communication will be sent from Sefton Council, in circumstances where that can only happen if the application is properly submitted;
iii. The Registered Person is clear in his evidence that he knew that the application had not been submitted;
iv. The email in which the Registered Person said that he had submitted the planning application is an apparently well considered document dealing not only with the planning application but the payment of an invoice and plans for the future of the project;
v. It is apparent from the Registered Persons email of 30 July 2023 and his subsequent evidence to the Committee that he believed that he was entitled to payment of the second invoice before he submitted the planning application and he would not have achieved this if he had actually submitted the planning application in the way he had said in the email of 26 July 2023.

54. For these reasons, the Committee is satisfied that the Registered Person wrote that he had submitted the planning application when he knew that he had not. The Committee then asked itself whether ordinary decent people would find that to be dishonest in an email from an architect to his client. The Committee was satisfied that they would and accordingly found Particular 4c proved.

55. The Committee acknowledged that it does not have to find a motive to be satisfied of dishonesty. Nevertheless, in light of the matter set out above and the Registered Persons apparent inability to explain, or at times, even remember, why he had written as he did, the Committee concluded that the most likely explanation was that he wanted to ensure that he was paid before he made the planning application without having a difficult conversation with his client about when the invoice needed to be paid in circumstances where he had only submitted it attached to his email of 26 July 2023.

56. Having found Particular 4c proved the Committee was satisfied there was no purpose in considering paragraph 4b separately because a finding of dishonesty would inevitably involve lack of integrity

Particular 2 evidence and submissions

57. Turning to Particular 2, the Committee accepted the advice of the Chair that this was a question of contractual interpretation which the Committee should carry out by reference to the written document. The Committee heard evidence that both the Referrer and the Registered Person had views as to what the terms meant but accepted that it was its own view of the written terms that mattered.

58. The Committee hopes that the Contract can be adequately summarised as follows.

59. The Contract set out the work under the heading “brief” in 13 stages, the 11th of which is “carry out drawing package for submission to building control”.

60. In the next section, the Contract sets out a program of work with approximate dates and references to stages in the RIBA agreement. Bullet points 1 to 5 start with “project set up and brief development and conclude with attain feedback or sign off from client” on 5 June. That stage is described as RIBA stage 2-3.

61. The sixth bullet point is “submit documents to local planning authority” that is described as stage three. The last two bullet points are “commence technical design on 26 June and submit technical design documents on 24 July.”

62. There is a section headed “fee and invoicing” in which the invoices are set out as follows:

i. Invoice 1 – Upon instruction of project to commence design 50% £2,813 + VAT
ii. Invoice 2 – Upon planning submission and start of technical design 25% £1,406 + VAT
iii. Invoice 3 – Upon submission of technical design documents 25% £1,406 + VAT

63. The Committee observed that there is another term in the “standard terms” of the contract providing that invoices will be paid within seven days of being submitted.

64. The Committee reminded itself that when the Registered Person was instructed, the Referrer paid 50% of the overall fee before any work was done, upon receiving invoice 1 dated 21 April 2023. It is the ARB’s case regarding Particular 2 that invoice 1, under which the Referrers paid 50% of the fee, included the submission of planning permission.

65. The Committee heard the evidence of the Referrer that she believed that the submission of the planning application was covered by invoice 1, which she paid when the Registered Person was appointed and before he began work.

66. The Committee did not doubt that the Referrer was sincere in this belief.

67. The Presenter relied in part upon the Referrer’s evidence and submitted that the Contract expressly state at stage 3 “Submit documents to local planning authority” – a clear and defined deliverable under RIBA Stage 3 (Exhibit 5, page C59), it is submitted. This had been paid for under Invoice 1.”

Particular 2 findings of fact (Particular 2 not proved)

68. The Committee concluded that this is not the correct way to read the contract which provides that invoice 1 covers 50% of the fees. There is nothing in the contract or invoice 1 to show that it covers the planning application. It is simply half the overall fees, payable in advance of any work. In the same way, invoice 3 is payable at the end of stage 4, in arrears of all work being completed.

69. Within that structure, invoice2 appears to be partly in arrears (triggered by the submission of the planning application) and in advance of technical design. The Committee observes that it is the only invoice that refers to planning application.

70. The Committee reminded itself that the burden of proving this allegation rests on the ARB and concluded that the documents simply do not support the allegation that the application for planning permission is covered by invoice 1.

71. Accordingly, the Committee found Particular 2 not proved. In those circumstances, the Committee was satisfied that the allegations in Particular 4 fell away.

Particulars 3 and 5 evidence and submissions.

72. The Committee reminded itself of the two emails (the second of which was sent twice) which the Registered Person sent on 5 August 2024 and which are summarised above. The Committee reminded itself that the first email alleged that the Referrers were using the Registered Persons drawings and designs in breach of copyright. The second email alleged that the Referrers had terminated their contract with him, otherwise than in accordance with the contract, leaving invoice 2 unpaid.

73. In the first email, the Registered Person claimed £8,437.50 plus VAT, as an estimate of damages for breach of copyright. In the second email, the Registered Person claimed payment of invoice 2 in the sum of £1,406 and accrued interest at 10% per day in the sum of £54,412.20

74. The Referrer gave evidence to the Committee that the receipt of these emails was deeply distressing for her and her partner, and she was confident that she did not owe any money to the Registered Person.

75. The Registered Person gave evidence that both emails were written to pursue genuine civil claims. In respect of the first email, he told the Committee that during the ARB investigation, he found what he believed to be good evidence that the drawings and designs that he had done had been used by the Referrers and disclosed to other professionals and a local authority, in order to complete their project.

76. He described that he was genuinely aggrieved that people who had spoken so ill of him had used his intellectual property without proper payment.

77. With regard to the second invoice, the Registered Person described how he had been concerned about the continuing financial drain on his practice of the ARB investigation. He had looked through his records and was convinced that the Referrers still owed him money in respect of invoice 2.

78. He described to the Committee that he had spoken to a friend who was a fund manager and who had put him in touch with a solicitor. He had received some preliminary advice but could not afford the solicitors’ fees. The solicitor had recommended to him an online interest calculator and with that he had calculated the interest due to him.

79. He told the Committee that he believed that the law entitled him to the amount he claimed although he had doubts and did not think that a judge would actually award the full amount of interest to him. He had understood that his emails would be distressing to the Referrers, but he did not intend to intimidate them.

80. He said that he realised now that the sum he claimed was excessive but at the time he believed that he was entitled to it although he accepted when questioned that before he sent the email it had crossed his mind that the amount he claimed was excessive. He reminded the Committee that he had never used the claim to try to pressure the Referrers to abandon their complaint to the ARB.

81. The Presenter submitted that the Registered Person’s conduct was dishonest because he knew he would not recover the amounts he claimed.

82. The Registered Person submitted that his actions were neither dishonest nor lacked integrity because he was pursuing a legitimate civil claim.

83. With regard to the issue of integrity, he raised the issue of two emails he had received from the ARB after the matters giving rise to Particular 3 had been reported to the ARB. In the first, an apparently senior member of the ARB staff wrote to him on 27 August 2024 in the following terms:

“ARB recognises that any architect is entitled to raise a legal claim in respect of breach of copyright or unpaid invoices.

We have however reviewed the amount being claimed, and you would appear to be labouring under a misunderstanding of how interest works. If the contract stipulates that interest will be charged at a daily rate equivalent to 10%, this means that the annual rate of 10% is charged in daily rate units. So, for example, a debt of £1406+VAT at 10% would be £168.70 a year, or £174.24 over 377 days. Your solicitor may be able to assist you with explaining what the correct interest calculation is.

While we do not intend to intervene in any legal proceedings, we are obligated to inform you that you have misapplied how late payment is calculated, and to persist with such a claim would in our view demonstrate a lack of integrity. If the matter is left unattended to, we will then need to review the position to determine if a further particular should be added to the existing complaint against you.

We would accordingly require your assurance that you will correct the mistake made on the interest claimed without delay, nonflying us within 7 days (by close of business on 3 September 2024) that the mistake has been attended to.
I look forward to hearing from you by no later than 3 September 2024.”

84. In the second email, on 30 August 2024, the ARB had written

“Dear Mr Lebari-Orleans,
I refer to the email below and this email serves as a reminder of the deadline given for you to notify us within 7 days (by close of business on 3 September 2024) that the mistake has been attended to.
Kind regards”

85. The Registered Person submitted that these emails, both in their content and tone, gave a concerning impression that the ARB had already formed a hostile view of his case before it had been heard. In these circumstances he was concerned that he might not get a fair hearing, in particular on this issue.

Particulars 3 and 5 findings of fact (Particulars 3 and 5a proved)

86. The Committee reminded itself that Particular 3 provides that the reason that the Registered Person did not act appropriately was that the demands he made were excessive. In the Solicitor’s report the ARB submit that the Registered Person “Plainly knew that he was not entitled to the money he was demanding”.

87. The Committee first considered each e-mail in turn. Regarding the first e-mail, seeking compensation for breach of copyright, the Committee concluded that the first email demanded a sum of money which may be too high but could not properly be described as excessive in the context of an alleged breach of copyright. For that reason, the Committee considered Particular 3 with regard to the second email only.

88. The Committee decided that the second email fell into a different category. The Committee decided that the amount claimed was so large in relation to the original invoice that it was proper to describe that demand as excessive.

89. The Committee then considered whether the claim by the Registered Person was dishonest. The Committee first considered the evidence of his stated knowledge and belief at the time he made the claim. The Committee reminded itself of the Registered Persons evidence that he had not just formed his own view of his entitlement under the contract but had sought the advice of a friend who worked in the financial industry. The Committee accepted the Registered Person’s account that he had been put in touch with a solicitor but had not been able to afford his fees and had been referred to an online calculator to work out the appropriate interest which he believed was properly calculated at 10% per day.

90. Having reviewed all the evidence, the Committee concluded that it was not satisfied that the ARB had established that the Registered Person knew he was not entitled to the sums he was claiming. The Committee concluded that the Registered Person’s state of mind was that he had his doubts and also doubted that the court would award him the sum acclaimed, but he was satisfied that he was entitled to payment of invoice 2 and the interest he had calculated.

91. The Committee then considered whether ordinary decent people would regard the Registered Person’s conduct as dishonest and concluded that they would think it fell just short of dishonesty because he held an honest if unreasonable belief that he was entitled to claim the money in the way that he did.

92. The Committee then asked itself whether the Registered Person’s conduct lacked integrity. The Committee reminded itself that the Registered Person’s had sought some advice but it was informal advice from someone to whom he had not given proper instructions and there is nothing in his evidence that could have given the Registered Person good reason to believe that he was entitled to a sum that was so large that it should have given rise to doubts in the mind of any professional person seeking payment from a former client.

93. The Committee then asked itself whether, taken together, the sum involved, the inherent unlikelihood that it was due to him, the doubts that he entertained and what the Committee regarded as the flimsy basis for his belief that he was entitled to the sum of interest he claimed, meant that he was acting without integrity.

94. The Committee concluded that the public would expect a professional person to take significant care before claiming such a large sum from a former client on the basis that a relatively small invoice had accrued so much interest. The Committee formed the view that the amount of interest claimed was shockingly high.

95. In those circumstances the Committee was satisfied that by claiming such a sum without a reasonable belief that it was due to him, and in circumstances where he had doubts himself, the Registered Person failed to live up to the ethical standards expected of an architect and accordingly acted without integrity.

96. Before finalising that decision, the Committee reflected on the concerns raised by the Registered Person in relation to the correspondence with the ARB. The Committee was concerned about the perception that, if the Registered Person had done as he was advised (or perhaps told), he would never have faced this allegation of acting without integrity.

97. The Committee treated those concerns with respect. Nevertheless, the Committee concluded that its duty was to reflect on what the Registered Person did and believed when he wrote the two emails that are the subject of Particulars 3 and 5. The Committee was satisfied that nothing the ARB said after the Registrant sent the emails affects the Committee’s central task of assessing what the Registered Person said and believed when he sent the emails to the Referrers. The Committee did not take into account the correspondence with the ARB when reaching its decision. The Committee observed in particular that there is no evidence that the Registered Person acted to his detriment because of the emails from the ARB.

98. For those reasons, the Committee was satisfied that the correspondence did not undermine its decision on Particulars 3 and 5.

99. Accordingly, the Committee found Particulars 3 and 5a proved.

Unacceptable Professional Conduct (UPC) Or Serious Professional Incompetence (SPI).

100. Having found particulars 1, 3, 4a, 4c, and 5a, of the Allegation proved the Committee went on to consider whether the Registered Person’s conduct amounted to UPC or SPI.

Submissions and advice

101. The Committee heard submissions from the Presenter and the Registered Person.

102. The Presenter submitted that the Registered Person’s conduct breached Standards 1.1 and 1.2 of the Architects Code. (which the Committee sets out below) and drew the Committee’s attention to the High Court decision in Spencer v General Osteopathic Council [2012] EWHC 3147 (Admin).

103. She submitted that the Committee should find that the matters proved amounted to UPC because it had found a degree of moral blameworthiness.

104. She submitted that the Registered Person’s dishonest act was isolated but, taken individually and together, the matters proved would be considered deplorable by fellow architects and members of the public and were likely to bring the profession into disrepute.

105. The Presenter also submitted that the Committee should consider whether the matters found proved amounted to SPI.

106. The Registered Person put his submissions before the Committee in writing. He acknowledged that the email he had written on 26th July 2023 was misleading and gave the impression that the planning application had been submitted, when it had not. He acknowledged that what he had done had contributed to a loss of trust and he expressed his regret for this. He reminded the Committee that there had been no previous findings (or even allegations of dishonesty) made against him. However, he was unable to accept that what he had done was dishonest.

107. The Registered Person agreed with the suggestion of the Chair that there was nothing else he could say about a finding of UPC, and he would reserve his position regarding matters of insight and remediation until he had heard the submissions of the Presenter and present them at the sanction stage if that arose.

108. The Committee followed the advice of the Chair.

The Committee’s approach

109. It reminded itself that a finding of UPC is a matter for its own independent judgment having regard to any facts found proved. There is no burden or standard of proof.

110. The Committee noted that UPC is defined in section 14(1)(a) of the Architects Act 1997 as conduct which falls short of the standard required of an Architect.

111. The Committee bore in mind the ARB guidance that UPC is defined as conduct which falls short of the standard required of a Registered Person. In reaching its findings on UPC, the Committee recognised that not every shortcoming on the part of an Architect, nor failure to comply with the provisions of the Code, will necessarily give rise to disciplinary proceedings or a finding of UPC.

112. The general test is whether he or she has fallen seriously short of the standard of conduct expected of a member of the profession in the circumstances.

113. The conduct found proved must be serious in order for unacceptable professional conduct to be found. The question of what is serious or not in the context is not a technical legal exercise but a question for the skilled judgment of the Professional Conduct Committee.

114. In deciding whether the facts found proved amount to UPC the Committee also had regard to Spencer v General Osteopathic Council [2012] EWHC 3147 (Admin). It bore in mind in reaching its decision that for a finding of UPC to be made, “a degree of moral blameworthiness on the part of the registrant likely to convey a degree of opprobrium to the ordinary intelligent citizen” was required. (The Committee observed that this is old fashioned language meaning that they would regard it as disgraceful).

115. The Committee also took into account the observation made by Kerr J in Shaw v The General Osteopathic Council [2015] EWHC 2721 (Admin) that, although the conduct in question must be sufficiently serious, it does not need to be of such gravity that imposing an admonishment would be too lenient.

116. The Committee also had regard to the case of Vranicki v Architects Registration Board [2007] EWHC 506 (Admin), which provided that the Committee should look at the picture as a whole when deciding SPI, and by implication, UPC.

The Committee’s decision

117. The Committee had regard to Standard 1.1 which provides:

1.1 You are expected at all times to act with honesty and integrity and to avoid any actions or situations which are inconsistent with your professional obligations. This standard underpins the Code and will be taken to be required in any consideration of your conduct under any of the other standards.

118. The Committee also had regard to Standard 1.2 which provides:

1.2 You should not make any statement which is contrary to your professional opinion or which you know to be misleading, unfair to others or discreditable to the profession.

119. The Committee reminded itself that not all breaches of the code will amount to UPC. Nevertheless, in this case the matter proved under Particulars 1 and 4 constituted dishonesty to a client during the course of professional work and the matters proved under Particulars 3 and 5 constituted a demand for a very significant sum of money without a proper reasonable basis for believing it was due.

120. The Committee observed that both those matters proved had caused significant distress to the Referrers and risked significantly damaging the reputation of the profession.

121. For those reasons, the Committee was satisfied that the matters proved amounted to UPC.

122. The Committee was also satisfied that there was no basis for finding that the matters proved amounted to SPI.

Decision on Sanction

123. Having found the Registered Person guilty of UPC, the Committee considered which, if any, sanction to impose.

124. The Committee heard submissions from the Presenter and from the Registered Person.

125. The Presenter told the Committee that the ARB did not seek to persuade the Committee to impose any particular sanction. She helpfully drew the Committee’s attention to the sanctions guidance (SG) and the aggravating and mitigating factors in this case. She reminded the Committee that the Registered Person had a previous disciplinary finding made against him at a hearing held from 22-25 August 2023 and 13-15 May 2024, in respect of matters that occurred in 2021. She pointed out that matter had not included an allegation of dishonesty.

126. She reminded the Committee that both dishonesty and a previous adverse disciplinary finding were identified as aggravating factors in the SG.

127. The Registered Person gave evidence and put the following documents before the Committee:

i. Mitigation Statement dated 10 July 2025
ii. A letter from RIBA dated 8 November 2024, showing that the Registered Person had taken part in the RIBA mentoring scheme in 2022 and 2023, mentoring a total of four students and “supporting their career progression.”
iii. A testimonial from a civil and structural engineer who had worked with the Registered Person and spoke highly of him personally and professionally in particular with regard to his leadership and full support for colleagues. It describes him as “an invaluable asset to the architecture profession”
iv. A draft appointment letter demonstrating that the Registered Person had made changes to his contractual arrangements to ensure better and more open contact with clients, to prevent mistrust and misunderstanding in future.

128. The Committee also reminded itself of other testimonials, which spoke well of the Registered Person’s work and his support for junior members of the profession.

129. The Registered Person acknowledged that “misrepresenting the status of a planning application, particularly in the context of requesting payment, is not only professionally unacceptable, but it also undermines the trust at the heart of the client-architect relationship. By misleading the clients, I failed to uphold the standards of integrity, honesty, and transparency that the public rightly expects of an architect.”

130. With regard to his demand for an excessive sum in September 2024, he said, “my subsequent demand for payment, far exceeding what was contractually or morally justifiable, demonstrated a serious lapse in judgment and a failure to manage a conflicting situation constructively. I can accept an understand that I showed a lack of integrity by relying on information that even I questioned.”

131. He went on to describe his understanding of the impact he had upon the clients and public trust in architects. He said he understood that “a moment of dishonesty can overshadow months of honest committed work” and he had learned that “trust once lost is difficult to regain.”

132. In his written and oral evidence, the Registered Person described how he had employed a practice manager, in the past three months, to ensure that contractual matters are properly overseen rather than relying upon him. He had also undertaken training in better business management with a reputable mentor. He showed the Committee a copy of his new documentation, which went some way to making his arrangements with his clients clearer.

133. Looking to the future he told the Committee that in a similar situation in the future he would clearly state what was happening with a planning application and request payment based on an honest explanation, not by misrepresenting facts. If a client declined to pay, he would follow the dispute resolution mechanisms in the contract or walk away, without threats or escalation.

134. At the end of his evidence, unprompted, the Registered Person said that when he heard the Referrer’s testimony, he could see the distress on her face and would not put that on anyone again. Having heard her evidence, he no longer thought she was using the ARB to extract money from him. He did not want to be in this situation again and said he had made mistakes which he will “stay away from until I retire”.

135. The Committee received the advice of the Chair, which it accepted and followed in its approach set out below.

136. In reaching its decision, the Committee had regard to all the evidence provided to it and took into account the submission made by the Presenter and the Registered Person. The Committee had regard to and applied the Professional Conduct Committee Sanctions Guidance (2022) published by the ARB. It also had regard to the Committee’s decision on facts and its findings in relation to UPC.

137. The Committee reminded itself that the primary purpose of sanctions is to protect members of the public, to maintain the integrity of the profession, and to declare and uphold proper standards of conduct and competence. It has borne in mind that the purpose of imposing a sanction is not to be punitive although it may have a punitive effect.

138. The Committee reminded itself that one result of that may be that matters of personal mitigation will be of less importance than they would be if the object were punishment. The Committee reminded itself of the principle laid down by the case of Bolton v Law Society [1994] 1 WLR 512 ‘The reputation of the profession is more important than the fortunes of any individual member. Membership of a profession brings many benefits, but that is part of the price.’

139. The Committee reminded itself that it must have regard to the principle of proportionality, that is to say that it must strike a proper balance between public protection and the rights of the Registered Person. Nevertheless, if a sanction is necessary for the protection of the public including in the wider public interest, it must be imposed. A sanction should be no more severe or restrictive than is necessary to achieve its aim.

140. The Committee reminded itself that it should identify any aggravating and mitigating factors and balance those factors to arrive at a view of the seriousness of the UPC it had found.

141. The Committee acknowledged that it should consider each sanction in turn starting with the least restrictive and reminded itself that the sanctions available are as follows, bearing in mind that a committee can, in appropriate circumstances, impose no sanction:

i. Reprimand
ii. Penalty order
iii. Suspension
iv. Erasure

142. The Committee identified the following aggravating factors:

i. Previous disciplinary history
ii. A finding of dishonesty
iii. Conduct or actions that were repeated or deliberate

143. With regard to the finding of dishonesty, the Committee reminded itself that The High Court and SG have directed Committees that dishonesty, although always a serious matter, can vary greatly in its seriousness and the Committee must carefully consider the nature of dishonesty and determine its seriousness.

144. The Committee observed the factors set out at paragraph 8.3 of SG which put dishonesty into the most serious category and so “more likely to result in erasure.” The Committee was satisfied that none of those matters applied to this case. Nonetheless the Committee observed that the dishonesty in this case occurred directly in connection with the Registered Person’s work and affected his clients.

145. The Committee observed that the dishonesty in this case was neither planned, nor repeated, nor sustained. It was a single act. The Committee also took into account that it was not motivated by a desire on the part of the Registered Person to obtain something to which he knew he was not entitled but was in pursuit of a payment he believed was due to him.

146. The Committee identified the following mitigating factors:

i. Evidence of developing insight and remorse
ii. Evidence of remedial action taken to prevent repetition

147. The Committee balanced the aggravating and mitigating factors and concluded that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors because, although the act of dishonesty was towards the lower end of cases of dishonesty, the UPC taken as a whole was serious because it included not just the single act of dishonesty but a subsequent serious failure to act with integrity a year later.

148. The Committee was particularly concerned that the dishonest statement was made by the Registered Person very shortly before he was due to appear before the PCC in 2023 and his demand for a large sum of money, which lacked integrity, was made three months after the PCC decision in 2024.

149. Nevertheless, the Committee acknowledged that through reflection, the work he undertook following his last disciplinary hearing and taking part in this hearing, the Registered Person has developed a better understanding of how he must conduct himself, including by communicating openly and honestly with clients rather than being suspicious of them and sharing his work concerns with colleagues.

150. Against this background, the Committee considered each of the sanctions in turn. The Committee considered first whether it should impose no sanction. The Committee had regard to paragraph 6.1 of SG and concluded that this case was far too serious to impose no sanction and there are no exceptional circumstances that would justify taking that course.

151. The Committee then considered imposing a reprimand. The Committee had regard to the matters set out in paragraph 6.2 of SG. The Committee concluded that this was not a matter that fell at the lower end of the scale of seriousness and reminded itself that the UPC found in this case could not be described as an isolated incident.

152. The Committee then considered a penalty order, that is to say a financial penalty of up to £2500. The Committee concluded that, while this sanction was open to the Committee, the UPC found in this case was too serious and the second matter giving rise to the finding of UPC had occurred after the Registered Person had already received a penalty order from a PCC.

153. The Committee then considered whether to impose a suspension order. The Committee reminded itself of paragraph 6.4.1 of SG, “A suspension order may be imposed by the PCC for serious offences, but where the circumstances are not so serious as to warrant erasure from the Register.”…” Any individual suspended from the Register cannot use the title ‘Architect’ in business or practice during that time (nor any reference to membership or fellowship of the Royal Institute of British Architects).”

154. The Committee had particular regard to the factors set out at 6.4.3 and concluded the following. The Committee was satisfied that the conduct is so serious that a reprimand or penalty order would be insufficient to protect the public or uphold public confidence in the profession for the reasons set out above. In summary, neither of those penalties would sufficiently mark the seriousness of the UPC found in this case. The Committee considered carefully whether the UPC found in this case was fundamentally incompatible with continuing to be an architect. The Committee reminded itself that honesty and integrity are fundamental to being an architect. The Committee balanced this against the following matters:

i. The Registered Person’s act of dishonesty fell at the lower end of the examples of dishonesty, for the reasons set out above;
ii. The Registered Person’s act which lacked integrity was serious and caused significant distress. However, the Committee accepted that it was done in pursuit of a claim he believed to be genuine;
iii. There is sufficient evidence of genuine remorse, growing insight and a real effort to change his practise that reassures the Committee that the Registered Person does not have an entrenched attitude that would mean he is likely to repeat unacceptable conduct including the conduct giving rise to a finding of UPC in this case;
iv. There is no suggestion of a repetition of similar behaviour since the last matter found proved in this case;
v. Taking all those matters together, the Committee is satisfied that the behaviour found in this case is unlikely to be repeated if the Registered Person is allowed to return to practise in due course.

155. Before finally concluding that a suspension order was the correct sanction in this case, the Committee considered whether an erasure order was necessary. For the reasons set out above the Committee concluded that the misconduct in this case was not fundamentally incompatible with practice as an architect. The Committee was strengthened in this view by the evidence of the steps taken by the Registered Person since his unacceptable conduct.

156. The Committee also had regard to paragraph 8.3 of SG which set out examples of the sort of dishonesty which are “considered more serious and so more likely to result in erasure”. The Committee was satisfied that the UPC in this case fell short of the “Dishonesty resulting in personal financial gain” or “Premeditated, systematic or longstanding deception.”, which would have made erasure more likely to be the appropriate sanction.

157. Accordingly, the Committee concluded that a Suspension Order was the appropriate sanction in this case.

158. The Committee then considered the appropriate length of that order. The Committee balanced the seriousness of the unacceptable conduct in this case, which pointed towards a suspension towards the higher end of the scale, against the mitigating factors set out above and the evidence of the contribution the Registered Person has made to assisting in the development of young architects.

159. The Committee concluded that the correct balance was struck by a suspension for 9 months. The Committee reminded itself that a suspension of this length is likely to cause significant financial and professional hardship to the Registered Person. However, the Committee concluded that no lesser sanction would be sufficient to protect the public and maintain public confidence in the profession.

160. Accordingly, the Committee imposes a suspension order for a period of 9 months.